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Abstract
In this paper the classical stable roommates problem is generalized to situations when the
two partners in a pair perform di4erent roles. We propose an e6cient algorithm to decide the
existence of a stable matching in this problem.
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1. Introduction
The classical stable roommates problem (SRP for short) introduced in [1] deals with
situations when a set of participants, say students, has to be partitioned into pairs,
i.e. each student has to be assigned a roommate. In this model it is supposed that
all the students have clear preferences over their prospective roommates and that a
participant’s satisfaction with a particular matching is based solely on the identity of
his roommate. Provided there are no two participants who prefer each other to their
partners in a particular matching, then the matching is called stable.
In some cases a simple partition of people into pairs is not an appropriate model.
Imagine a group of pilots, who have to be partitioned into two-person aeroplane crews.
In a crew, say, one pilot is the captain and the other the navigator. It is natural to
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expect that a pilot’s evaluation of a crew depends not only on the identity of his
partner, but also on the distribution of the roles. For example, pilot i may like pilot j
as a navigator, but consider him to be quite a poor captain.
In this paper, we propose to model such situations by allowing each participant i
to include in his preference list two copies of every other participant j, representing
the two possible roles j can perform in a crew consisting of i and j. We show that
our ‘stable crews problem’ (SCP for short) is a generalization of the stable roommates
problem. Further, if the preferences of participants are strict, it is possible to decide
the existence of a stable matching by a polynomial algorithm that is an extension of
Irving’s classical stable roommates algorithm [2,3].
In Section 2, we deMne formally the stable crews problem and introduce the essential
terminology used in the paper. Section 3 is devoted to the relation between the SRP
and the SCP. The stable crews algorithm is derived in Section 4. Finally, Section 5
summarizes the results and outlines possible topics for future research.
2. Denitions and notation
N is the set of participants and we suppose that |N |= n is even. The set N ×{1; 2}
will represent the participants with assigned roles. An element [i; t]∈N × {1; 2} will
usually be denoted by it .
For each participant i∈N there is a complete, reOexive and transitive preference
relation deMned on a subset of (N \ {i})× {1; 2} denoted by i. If at i bs, then we
say that participant i prefers participant a in role t to participant b in role s. If at i bs
and bs i at , then we say that participant i is indi6erent between participants a; b in
the respective roles and we shall write at ∼i bs. If at i bs and bs i at does not hold,
then participant i strictly prefers participant a in role t to participant b in role s and
we shall write at 	i bs. The preference relation of participant i∈N will be represented
by an ordered preference list denoted by P(i). We say that participant j in role t is
acceptable for participant i if jt appears in P(i). Otherwise, jt is unacceptable for i.
(Note that j in role 3− t may still be acceptable for i.)
An n-tuple of preference lists of all participants from N will be called a preference
pro8le and denoted by P.
Denition 1. An instance of the stable crews problem is a pair {N;P}.
Denition 2. For a given instance {N;P} of the SCP, a function  :N → N × {1; 2}
will be called a matching, if for all i; j∈N and t ∈{1; 2} the following conditions are
fulMlled:
(i) (i)∈P(i),
(ii) if (i) = jt , then j = i,
(iii) (i) = jt ⇔ (j) = i3−t .
If (i)= j2 (or, equivalently, (j)= i1) we shall write, with some abuse of notation,
(i1; j2)∈ .
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Denition 3. A pair (i1; j2)∈ [N × {1; 2}]2 is called a blocking pair for a matching 
if j2 	i (i) and i1 	j (j). A matching is called stable if it is free of blocking pairs.
A pair (i1; j2) will be called a stable pair if there exists a stable matching  such that
(i1; j2)∈ .
Example 1. Consider the following preference proMle for the set of participants N =
{a; b; c; d}:
P(a) = b1; b2; d2; c1; c2; d1;
P(b) = a2; d1; c2; d2; a1;
P(c) = a2; b2; b1; a1; d1; d2;
P(d) = b1; a1; c1:
Here, for example, the Mrst choice of participant b is participant a in the second role,
his second choice is participant d in the Mrst role, his third choice participant c in the
second role, etc. Notice that b’s Mrst choice is participant a in the second role while
b’s last choice is participant a in Mrst role; also c in the Mrst role is unacceptable for
b.
Notice also that the pair (a1; b2) could never be a stable pair, since it would always
be blocked by (a2; b1) (the participants would simply switch their roles in a crew).
3. Stable crews generalize stable roommates
Theorem 4. For every instance I of the SRP with n participants there exists an
instance I ′ of the SCP with n participants such that every stable matching of I
corresponds to a stable matching of I ′ and vice versa.
Proof. Suppose that I = (N;P) is an instance of the SRP. Let us deMne an arbitrary
strict linear ordering  on N and deMne an instance I ′ = (N;P′) of the SCP in the
following way: For each x∈N replace each participant y∈P(x) by two consecutive
copies of y in order y1; y2 if yx and in order y2; y1 otherwise.
Let  be a stable matching for I . Let us deMne a matching ′ for I ′ as follows:
if {x; y}∈  in I and xy, then (x1; y2)∈ ′. Clearly, ′ is a matching for I ′ and
we show that it is stable as well. First, (x)∈P(x) for each x, hence due to the
construction of P′ and ′ we have ′(x)∈P′(x).
Now suppose that a pair (u1; v2) blocks ′. This means that ′(u) ≺u v2 and ′(v) ≺v
u1. Let us consider three possible cases:
(1) ′(u) = v1 and ′(v) = u2. Then ′(u) ≺u vt and ′(v) ≺v ut for both t = 1; 2 in
P′. But then v 	u (u) and u 	v (v) in P, which implies that the pair {u; v}
blocks  in I . A contradiction.
(2) ′(u) = v1 and ′(v) = u2 or ′(u) = v1 and ′(v) = u2 in I ′. This contradicts the
deMnition of a matching.
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(3) ′(u) = v1 and ′(v) = u2. Since v2 	u ′(u) = v1 and u1 	v ′(v) = u2, we have
uv. But, the deMnition of ′ implies (u1; v2)∈ ′, a contradiction.
To prove the converse implication, let us deMne for a stable matching ′ in I ′ a
matching  in I as follows: if (x1; y2)∈ ′ in I ′ (notice that in this case (y1; x2) is not
a stable pair in I ′), then {x; y}∈  in I . Obviously,  is a matching for I . Now suppose
that  is not stable, i.e., there exists a blocking pair {u; v} for . Then (u) ≺u v and
(v) ≺v u and so (u)t ≺u vs and (v)t ≺v us for t; s = 1; 2 which implies that ′ is
not stable, a contradiction.
A converse of Theorem 4 is not true, i.e. there are instances of the SCP for which
it is not clear how to deMne a ‘corresponding’ instance of the SRP (see Example 1);
or this corresponding instance is quite natural, but the SCP-matchings do not lead
unambiguously to SRP-matchings, as is illustrated by the following example.
Example 2. Consider the following preference proMles for the SCP with two partici-
pants a; b.
P1: P(a) = b1, P2: P(a) = b1; b2, P3: P(a) = b1; b2,
P(b) = a1. P(b) = a2; a1. P(b) = a1; a2.
Obviously, to all three preference proMles only one preference proMle
P : P(a) = b;
P(b) = a
for the SRP can be assigned; giving a unique stable matching ={a; b}. Nevertheless,
P1 does not admit any matching, for P2 there is a unique stable matching 2 =
{(b1; a2)}, while in P3 there are two stable matchings 3={(b1; a2)} and ′3={(a1; b2)}.
4. The stable crews algorithm
In this section we always consider an instance of the SCP with strict preferences.
The algorithm described in this section is an extension of Irving’s classical Stable
Roommates Algorithm, see [3,2]. Therefore let us now recall this algorithm in brief.
The Stable Roommates Algorithm starts with a so-called consistent preference proMle
(a preference proMle is consistent, if for each pair of participants x; y∈N : x∈P(y) if
and only if y∈P(x)) and it consists of two phases.
Phase 1 is based on a sequence of proposals. A free participant, say x, proposes to
the Mrst participant in his list, say y. As a result, participant x becomes semiengaged
to y and y deletes all the participants worse than x from his preference list. Phase
1 terminates when some preference list becomes empty (then the given instance of
the SRP has no stable solution) or when there are no more free participants left. If
on termination every preference list contains just one entry, then the reduced proMle
constitutes a stable solution. Otherwise, the algorithm proceeds with Phase 2.
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In Phase 2 pairs of participants are further deleted from the proMle by means of
rotation elimination. (The notion of a rotation will be explained later.) The termination
conditions for Phase 2 are identical to those for Phase 1.
Due to the fact that the SCP, in contrast to the SRP, considers participants in roles,
we need to incorporate certain modiMcations and revisions to Irving’s original algo-
rithm:
(1) We require a strictly consistent pro8le as the input to the algorithm.
(2) Phase 1 is, apart from technical details, identical with Phase 1 of Irving’s algorithm.
(3) Phase 2 is analogous to Irving’s Phase 2, but we introduce a new element, called
the double favourite elimination.
Every proMle generated during the execution of the algorithm will be referred to as a
reduced pro8le. For a given reduced preference proMle T and a participant x, the Mrst,
the second and the last participant in the respective roles in x’s preference list PT (x)
will be denoted by fT (x); sT (x) and lT (x), respectively. (If the proMle is clear from
the context, then the subscripts indicating the proMle can be omitted.)
4.1. Strict consistency
The notion of strict consistency is a generalization of consistency deMned for the
SRP.
Denition 5. Let {N;P} be an instance of the SCP. We say that a preference proMle P
is strictly consistent, if for all participants x; y∈N and t ∈{1; 2} the following holds:
(i) xt ∈P(y) if and only if y3−t ∈P(x).
(ii) if yt; y3−t ∈P(x) and yt 	x y3−t , then xt 	y x3−t .
The second condition is implied by the consideration that if yt 	x y3−t , and
x3−t 	y xt , then the pair (xt ; y3−t) is always blocked by the pair (yt; x3−t).
We shall suppose that the input preference proMle is strictly consistent (which is
otherwise trivial to achieve by appropriate deletions). In the algorithm every deletion,
e.g. deletion of xt from P(y), always means deletion of the pair (xt ; y3−t), i.e. y3−t is
also deleted from P(x) thus preserving strict consistency.
Example 3. Consider the instance {N;P} of the SCP with the set of participants N =
{a; b; c; d; e; f} and the preference proMle P:
P(a) = d1; f2; b1; d2; b2; e1; e2; f1,
P(b) = c1; c2; a1; e1; e2; a2; d1; f2,
P(c) = d2; e2; b1; e1; f1; b2,
P(d) = b2; f1; c1; a2; e1; f2; e2,
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P(e) = a1; c2; a2; f2; c1; f1; d2; d1,
P(f) = b1; b2; d1; d2; c2; a1; e2; a2; d2.
The corresponding strictly consistent proMle is:
P(a) = d1; f2; b1; b2; e1; e2;
P(b) = c1; c2; a1; a2; d1; f2;
P(c) = d2; e2; b1; e1; f1; b2;
P(d) = b2; f1; c1; a2; e1; f2;
P(e) = a1; c2; a2; c1; f1; d2; d1;
P(f) = b1; d1; d2; c2; a1; e2; d2; (1)
and can now be used as an input for Phase 1 of the algorithm.
The algorithm may end in several places. On such occasions, the termination con-
dition, summarized algorithmically as function Terminate, is evaluated.
4.2. Phase 1
Phase 1 of the SCP algorithm is almost identical to Phase 1 of Irving’s Stable
Roommates Algorithm; we just have to take into account the roles of participants. If
participant x proposes to f(x) = yt , then x becomes semiengaged to yt and we delete
all the pairs (zs; y3−s) such that y prefers x3−t to zs. A formal deMnition of Phase 1
follows.
Phase 1 involves a certain nondeterminism caused by the freedom of choice of
participants making proposals. Nevertheless, as in Irving’s original algorithm, this non-
determinism has no consequence. Apart from the roles of the participants, the proof of
the following Lemma is identical with the proof of the corresponding Lemma 4.2.1. in
[2].
Lemma 6. For a given instance of the SCP, all possible executions of Phase 1 of
the SCP algorithm yield the same reduced preference pro8le.
Example 4. We now illustrate Phase 1 for the strictly consistent proMle (1). Suppose
that the Mrst participant making a proposal is a, who proposes to f(a)=d1. Therefore
d will delete all the participants whom he considers worse than a2, hence pairs (e1; d2)
and (d1; f2) will be deleted. Then suppose that c proposes to f(c) = d2. Then a
becomes free and d deletes participant a in role 2, hence the pair (d1; a2). Participant
a proposes again, to his current favourite, f2, etc.
As the result, we get the following proMle T :
P(a) = f2; b1; b2; e1; e2 |f2
P(b) = c1; c2; a1; a2; d1 |c1
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P(c) = e2; b1; e1; f1; b2 |e2
P(d) = b2; f1 |b2
P(e) = a1; c2; a2; c1 |a1
P(f) = d2; c2; a1 |d2: (2)
Here Phase 1 terminates because there is no free participant. Everybody is semiengaged
to his current favourite, as indicated in the last column.
The Stable Crews Algorithm, Termination Condition
1. function Terminate (T :proMle): boolean;
2. begin if at least one preference list is empty
3. then Terminate := true (comment: T admits no SCP matching)
4. else if every preference list consists of exactly one entry
5. then Terminate := true (comment: T is a SCP matching)
6. else Terminate := false;
7. end;
The Stable Crews Algorithm, Phase 1
1. assign all participants to be free;
2. while (some participant is free) and (no preference list is empty) do
3. begin take any free participant x;
4. yt := f(x);
5. if some participant z; z = x, is semiengaged to ym
6. then assign z to be free;
7. assign x to be semiengaged to yt ;
8. for each us such that x3−t 	y us do delete the pair (us; y3−s);
9. end;
It is possible that Phase 1 terminates with a reduced proMle in which a stable matching
can be easily determined, as in the following proMle:
P(a) = b1; b2,
P(b) = a1; a2,
where two stable matchings {(a1; b2)} and {(b1; a2)} exist. (One of them will be
determined during Phase 2.) In such cases, we still continue with Phase 2, in order to
make the SCP algorithm as analogous to the SRP algorithm as possible.
It follows from the deMnition of the algorithm that in any preference proMle resulting
from Phase 1 of the SCP algorithm every participant is semiengaged to someone
and there are no two participants semiengaged to the same participant in any role
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simultaneously. Moreover, nobody can be semiengaged to two di4erent participants at
the same time.
Lemma 7. Let T be the preference pro8le resulting from Phase 1 of the SCP al-
gorithm for a given instance {N;P} of the SCP. Then for all x; y∈N; x = y and
t ∈{1; 2} we have
(i) fT (x) = yt ⇔ lT (y) = x3−t ,
(ii) (x1; y2) ∈ T ⇔ (lT (x) 	x y2 or lT (y) 	y x1).
Proof. Identical (apart from the roles of participants) to the proof of the corresponding
Lemma 4.2.2. in [2].
Lemma 8. Let T be the preference pro8le resulting from Phase 1 of the SCP algo-
rithm for a given instance {N;P}. Then:
(i) If (x1; y2) ∈ T , then (x1; y2) is not a stable pair.
(ii) If at least one preference list in T is empty, then {N;P} has no stable solution.
Proof. Analogous to Lemma 4.2.3 in [2].
(i) By contradiction. Suppose that (x1; y2) ∈ T and there exists a stable matching 
with (x1; y2)∈ . Moreover suppose that (x1; y2) was the Mrst stable pair deleted during
Phase 1. This could only happen when some participant z, z = y, proposed to xt and
z3−t 	x y2: (3)
(The case of u’s proposal to ys while u3−s 	y x1 is similar). Hence in the corresponding
reduced proMle T : fT (z) = xt 	z (z) = xs for both s∈{1; 2}. Combined with (3) we
get that the pair (xt ; z3−t) blocks , a contradiction.
(ii) This assertion is implied by point (i) of this lemma.
Denition 9. A preference proMle T is called stable if the following conditions hold:
(1) T is strictly consistent,
(2) fT (x) = yt ⇔ lT (y) = x3−t , for all x; y∈N and t ∈{1; 2},
(3) (x1; y2) ∈ T ⇔ (lT (x) 	x y2 or lT (y) 	y x1), for all x; y∈N , t ∈{1; 2},
(4) no preference list in T is empty.
Lemma 10. Let T be a stable pro8le. Then the following statements hold:
(i) If  is a matching embedded in T , then no pair absent from T blocks .
(ii) If PT (x) = yt , then PT (y) = x3−t , for all x; y∈N and t ∈{1; 2}.
(iii) If every participant’s preference list in T consists of exactly one entry then T
constitutes a stable matching.
(iv) Every participant x∈N is the favourite of exactly one participant from
N={x}.
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Proof. (i) Implied by DeMnition 5(3), since for each matching  embedded in T we
have (x) x lT (x) for all x∈N .
(ii) If PT (x) = yt , then fT (x) = yt and lT (x) = yt , which happens due to DeMnition
9(2), if and only if lT (y) = x3−t and fT (y) = x3−t . Hence PT (y) = x3−t .
(iii) Consequence of assertions (i) and (ii) of this lemma.
(iv) Let us suppose that there is a participant x∈N such that x is the favourite of
two di4erent participants z; v∈N , z = v. Then fT (z) = xt and fT (v) = xs for some
t; s∈{1; 2}. Since T is a stable proMle, lT (x)= z3−t and lT (x)=v3−s, which contradicts
the assumption z = v.
Lemma 11. Every preference pro8le without empty preference lists resulting from
Phase 1 of the SCP algorithm is stable.
Proof. Implied by Lemma 2.
4.3. Phase 2
Phase 2 of Irving’s original algorithm consists of elimination of rotations. This is
possible because in case of the SRP, there is always a rotation embedded in a stable
proMle containing at least one preference list with at least two entries. On the contrary,
for the SCP we cannot use the identical deMnition of a rotation and even then the
existence of a rotation in a stable proMle cannot be guaranteed. This is because of the
so-called double favourites (this notion will be deMned later).
Therefore Phase 2 for the SCP consists of a while loop in which elimination of
double favourites (Section 4.3.1) alternates with searching for and eliminating rotations
(Section 4.3.2). The formal statement follows:
The Stable Crews Algorithm, Phase 2
1. while not Terminate (T ) do
2. begin Double Favourite Elimination(T );
3. if not Terminate (T ) then
4. begin := Find Rotation(T );
5. Eliminate Rotation(T; );
6. end;
7. end;
4.3.1. Double favourites elimination
Let us Mrst introduce some terminology and notation that will be used in this section.
Denition 12. Let x; y∈N; x = y and t ∈{1; 2}. We say that participant x has a double
favourite (yt; y3−t) in a preference proMle T if fT (x) = yt and sT (x) = y3−t . The set
of all x∈N having a double favourite in T will be denoted by D(T ).
The Double favourites elimination is deMned by the following procedure.
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We can imagine that the participant with a double favourite makes a proposal to the
second entry in his preference list. For a Mxed participant x having a double favourite
(yt; y3−t), the operations in line No. 5 will be referred to as a double favourite deletion.
The SCP Algorithm, Double Favourite Elimination
1. procedure Double Favourite Elimination(var T :proMle);
2. begin while D(T ) = ∅ do
3. begin take any x∈D(T );
4. let fT (x) = yt and sT (x) = y3−t ;
5. delete all pairs (zs; y3−s) such that xt 	y zs;
6. update D(T );
7. end;
8. end;
The reduced preference proMle obtained after the Double Favourite Elimination from a
proMle T , will be denoted by TD.
Example 7. Consider proMle T from (2). Here, D(T ) = {b}, and his double favourite
is (c1; c2). Hence b will delete his double favourite (c1; c2), which means that c will
delete all participants whom he considers worse than b1 from his preference list. After
deleting this double favourite we get T ′:
P(a) = f2; b1; b2; e1; e2,
P(b) = c2; a1; a2; d1,
P(c) = e2; b1,
P(d) = b2; f1,
P(e) = a1; a2; c1,
P(f) = d2; a1.
The updated D(T ′)={e} and we delete the double favourite (a1; a2) from e’s preference
list. We get the reduced proMle TD:
P(a) = f2; b1; b2; e1;
P(b) = c2; a1; a2; d1;
P(c) = e2; b1;
P(d) = b2; f1;
P(e) = a2; c1;
P(f) = d2; a1: (4)
Since D(TD) = ∅, the double favourites elimination terminates.
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Lemma 13. Let T be a stable preference pro8le, x∈D(T ) and T ′ the reduced pro8le
generated by the deletion of x’s double favourite (yt; y3−t) from T . Then
(1) fT ′(x) = sT (x) = y3−t and fT ′(z) = fT (z) for all z = x,
(2) lT ′(y) = xt and lT ′(z) = lT (z) for all z = y.
Proof. Since in order to delete the double favourite (yt; y3−t), all the pairs (us; y3−s)
such that xt 	y us are deleted, the pair (yt; x3−t) is among them, but (xt ; y3−t) not.
Hence we have the Mrst part of (1).
Now, let us take z = x. Let fT (z)=ws. Then w = y. If {x; y}∩{z; w}= ∅, then the
pair (ws; z3−s) will not be deleted since all the deleted pairs have a member equal to
y. If z=y then xt remains in the preference list of y and hence also all the preceding
entries including fT (y). If z = y and w= x then the only deleted pair containing x is
the pair (yt; x3−t), which means that also in this case fT (z) remains preserved.
For the second point realize that lT ′(y)=xt follows from the deMnition of the double
favourite deletion. Further, since all the deleted pairs have as one of their entries y
and y does not delete his favourite, stability of T implies that no participant deletes
his last entry.
Lemma 14. Every deletion of a double favourite in the course of the Double Favourite
Elimination preserves the stability of the reduced pro8le.
Proof. Suppose that T is a stable proMle and T ′ its subproMle generated by the deletion
of the double favourite (yt; y3−t) of participant x. It is su6cient to show that properties
(1)–(4) from DeMnition 9 hold for T ′ as well.
Point (1) is trivial and points (2) and (4) follow from the previous Lemma.
To prove (3) we need to show for arbitrary z; w∈N :
(z1; w2) ∈ T ′ ⇔ (lT ′(z) 	z w2 or lT ′(w) 	w z1):
The ⇐ direction is trivial. For the other direction also the case (z1; w2) ∈ T is easy.
Let us therefore suppose (z1; w2)∈T but (z1; w2) ∈ T ′. Then either z = y or w = y,
let us suppose without loss of generality that z = y. Thus the pair (z1 = y1; w2) was
deleted because xt 	y w2, but this is equivalent with lT ′(z) 	z w2.
By iterated application of Lemma 14 we get
Lemma 15. If a pro8le T is stable then the corresponding reduced pro8le TD obtained
by the Double Favourites Elimination is a stable subpro8le of T .
Let us call a stable proMle without double favourites a valid stable pro8le. Now we
deal with stable matchings embedded in reduced proMles.
Lemma 16. Let T be a stable preference pro8le, x∈D(T ) and T ′ the reduced pro8le
generated by the deletion of x’s double favourite (yt; y3−t) from T . Then no stable
pair contained in T was deleted, except, possibly (x3−t ; yt), in which case (y3−t ; xt)
is a stable pair contained in T ′.
12 K. Cechlarova, S. Ferkova /Discrete Applied Mathematics 140 (2004) 1–17
Proof. Suppose that there is a stable matching ∈T such that (up; v3−p)∈  and that
the pair (up; v3−p) was deleted. This is only possible if, say, up = yt . Now distinguish
two cases.
Case 1. v3−p = x3−t . It is easy to see that stability of  will not be violated if in 
we replace the pair (yt; x3−t) by (y3−t ; xt).
Case 2. v = x, hence (xs; z3−s)∈  for some z = y. But since the pair (up=yt; v3−t)
was deleted, we know that xt 	y v3−t and y3−t 	x z3−s as yt and y3−t are the two
entries in the beginning of x′s preference list. Hence the pair (xt ; y3−t) blocks , a
contradiction of the stability of .
4.3.2. Elimination of rotations
In this section we shall extend the classical concept of rotation for the SCP. Classical
rotations are based directly on the entries in the respective preference lists; now we
have to consider only the identity of participants and forget their roles.
Denition 17. Let xt ∈N × {1; 2}. Then xt= x.
Denition 18. Let T be a valid stable proMle. A sequence
= (x0; y0)(x1; y1) · · · (xr−1; yr−1);
such that
yi = fT (xi); yi+1 = sT (xi);
where i is taken modulo r, will be called a rotation exposed in T .
Sets {x0; x1; : : : ; xr−1}= X and {y0; y1; : : : ; yr−1}= Y will be called the X -set and
the Y -set of , respectively.
The proof of the following Lemma 19 is, apart from the roles of participants, iden-
tical with the proof of corresponding Lemma 4.2.6. in [2]. We include it here for
completeness.
Lemma 19. If T is a valid stable pro8le with at least one preference list containing
at least two di6erent participants then there is at least one rotation exposed in T .
Proof. Constructive. Let us denote by S(T ) the following set:
S(T ) = {x∈N |(∃y; z ∈N; y = z)(∃t; s∈{1; 2})yt; zs ∈PT (x)}:
Lemma 10 (ii) implies: if x∈S(T ) and yt ∈PT (x), then y∈S(T ). In particular
sT (x) ∈S(T ) for all x∈S(T ). That means that the function sT (x) is well
deMned on the set S(T ), and so is the function nextT (x) = lT sT (x).
Let us now deMne a directed graph H(T )=(S(T ); E) by the condition (x; y)∈E ⇔
y = nextT (x):
We have that outdegree of x is 1 and nextT (x) = x for all x∈S(T ), thus there exists
at least one cycle inH(T ). Let us denote the vertices in this cycle by (x0; x1; · · · ; xr−1)
in the given order. Since xi+1 = lT (sT (xi)= nextT (xi) for each i∈{0; 1; : : : ; r − 1},
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the cycle (x0; x1; : : : ; xr−1) deMnes a rotation  = (x0; fT (x0))(x1; fT (x1)) · · ·
(xr−1; fT (xr−1)) exposed in T .
It is easy to see that the above proof enables us to Mnd a rotation just as in the
stable roommates case: starting from any participant x in S(T ) traverse the unique
path in H(T ) from the node x until some node is visited twice, when a cycle has
been encountered. However, the assumption that the proMle T is a valid stable proMle
is crucial.
The SCP Algorithm, Find Rotation
1. function Find Rotation (T :proMle): rotation;
2. begin construct the graph H(T );
3. Mnd a cycle (x0; x1; : : : ; xr−1) in H(T );
4. Find Rotation:= (x0; f(x0))(x1; f(x1)) · · · (xr−1; f(xr−1));
5. end;
Example 9. Consider the TD proMle (4) from Example 7. Since the termination con-
dition is not fulMlled, the algorithm proceeds with a search for a rotation.
Since nextT (a) = d, nextT (b) = e, nextT (c) = d, nextT (d) = a, nextT (e) = b and
nextT (f) = e, we can see that there are two rotation exposed in TD: 1 = (a; f)(d; b)
and 2 = (b; c)(e; a).
In what follows we shall describe how to eliminate a rotation exposed in a valid
stable proMle T . Following Irving, we shall use the notation T= to denote the reduced
proMle obtained from a proMle T by the elimination of a rotation .
Elimination of rotations is summarized in the following algorithm.
The SCP Algorithm, Eliminate Rotation
1. procedure Eliminate Rotation (var T :proMle, :rotation);
2. begin for all i := 0 to r − 1 do (comment: r is the length of )
3. begin xi−1m := the last occurrence of x
i−1 in PT (yi);
4. delete all the pairs (zs; yi3−s) such that y
i prefers xi−1m to zs;
5. end;
6. end;
Example 10 (Example 9, continued). Consider the proMle TD (4) and let us eliminate
e.g. 1. Participant b deletes all the participants worse than the last occurrence of a in
P(b) and f deletes all participants worse than d2. We get the proMle T ′ = TD=1:
P(a) = b1; b2; e1,
P(b) = c2; a1; a2,
P(c) = e2; b1,
P(d) = f1,
P(e) = a2; c1,
P(f) = d2.
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T ′ does not fulMll the termination condition, hence a new iteration of the while loop
is required. First we eliminate double favourites. D(T ′) = {a} and after deleting the
double favourite (b1; b2) we get T ′D:
P(a) = b2; e1,
P(b) = c2; a1,
P(c) = e2; b1,
P(d) = f1,
P(e) = a2; c1,
P(f) = d2.
Now D(T ) = ∅ and we Mnd a rotation exposed in T ′D. There are two cycles in H(T ′D)
leading to two rotations 3 = (a; b)(c; e) and 4 = (b; c)(e; a). We can choose one of
them, say 3 and we get T ′′ = T ′D=3:
P(a) = e1,
P(b) = c2,
P(c) = b1,
P(d) = f1,
P(e) = a2,
P(f) = d2.
T ′′ now fulMlls the termination condition and it constitutes a stable matching  =
{(b1; c2); (e1; a2); (f1; d2)}.
The following lemma is an extension of Lemma 4.2.7. of [2].
Lemma 20. Let  = (x0; y0)(x1; y1) · · · (xr−1; yr−1) be a rotation exposed in a valid
stable pro8le T . If no preference list in T= is empty, then:
(i) fT=(xi) = sT (xi) = yi+1t , for all i: 06 i6 r − 1 and some t ∈{1; 2},
(ii) lT=(yi) = xi−1m , where x
i−1
m is the last occurrence of x
i−1 in PT (yi) for all
i : 06 i6 r − 1 and some m∈{1; 2},
(iii) fT=(x) = fT (x) for all x ∈ X and lT=(y) = lT (y) for all y ∈ Y.
Proof. (i) Let fT (xi) = yit . The pair (x
i
3−t ; y
i
t) = (x
i
3−t ; fT (x
i)) is deleted, because yi
prefers both occurrences of xi−1 before xi3−t due to stability of T . If (x
i; sT (xi)) were to
be deleted, then this could only be because xi is yj for some j and yj prefers the last
occurrence of xj−1 to sT (xi)=yi+1t , in which case all the successors of y
i+1
t in xi’s list
are also deleted. As a consequence, xi+1’s list would become empty, a contradiction
of the assumption in the formulation of the theorem.
(ii) The deMnition of rotation implies that all the successors of the last occurrence of
xi−1 are deleted from yi’s list. An argument similar to that used in (i) shows that if the
last occurrence of xi−1 in yi’s list is deleted then the Mrst entry in xi−1’s list as well
as all its successors are deleted, so xi−1’s list becomes empty, again a contradiction.
(iii) Immediate consequence of the deMnition of rotation elimination.
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The following lemma is an extension of Lemma 4.2.8. of [2].
Lemma 21. Let T be a valid stable pro8le and  a rotation exposed in T . If no
preference list in T= is empty, then T= is a stable subpro8le of T .
Proof. The fact that T= is a subproMle of T follows directly from the deletion-like
character of the algorithm. Therefore, it is su6cient to show that T= fulMlls conditions
(1)–(4) from DeMnition 9.
(1) trivial,
(2) immediate consequence of the previous lemma and the fact that T is a valid
stable proMle,
(3) trivial if (xt ; y3−t) ∈ T . Otherwise if (xt ; y3−t) is deleted on the elimination of
, this must be because y is yi for some i and yi prefers the last occurrence of xi−1,
xi−1s = lT=(y
i) to xt , or x is yi for some i and yi prefers the last occurrence of xi−1
to y3−t . This is su6cient to establish (3) for all cases.
(4) From Lemma 20.
In general, the statement: fT=(x) = sT=(x) for all x, where T is a valid stable
proMle and  is a rotation embedded in T , does not hold. Therefore, it is necessary to
execute the Double Favourite Elimination again. After that, if the termination condition
is not fulMlled, a new rotation is found and eliminated as long as the termination
condition is not fulMlled.
Lemma 22. Let  be a rotation exposed in a valid stable pro8le T . Then the following
holds:
(i) If there is a stable matching  embedded in T , then either (xi)=fT (xi), for all
i∈{0; 1; : : : ; r − 1} or (xi) = fT (xi), for all i∈{0; 1; : : : ; r − 1}.
(ii) If there is a stable matching  embedded in T such that (xi) = fT (xi) for all
i∈{0; 1; : : : ; r − 1}, then there exists a stable matching ′ =  embedded in T
such that ′(xi) = fT (xi) for all i∈{0; 1; : : : ; r − 1}.
Proof. Let  be a stable matching embedded in T .
(i) Let us suppose that there is i∈{0; 1; : : : ; r− 1} such that (xi)=fT (xi)=yip for
some p∈{1; 2}. Stability of T implies lT (yi)=xi3−p. Let us also recall that fT (xi−1)=
yi−1r and sT (x
i−1) = yiq for some r; q∈{1; 2}. Hence if xi−1 is not matched to yi−1
under , then, since yi is matched to the last entry in his list, the pair (yi; xi−1) would
be blocking. By induction, we get (xj) = fT (xj) for all j∈{0; 1; : : : ; r − 1}.
(ii) In this case, moreover, X∩Y=∅. For if not, then there exist j; k ∈{0; 1; : : : ; r−1}
such that: xj = yk . Since (xi) = fT (xi) = yipi for all i and some pi ∈{1; 2}, then
(yk) = xk3−pi and stability of T implies that (y
k) = lT (yk). But according to the
assumption yk ∈X, therefore (yk)=fT (yk). We get fT (yk)=lT (yk), a contradiction
with yk ∈X.
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We will now construct a new matching ′ as follows: for all x ∈ X∪Y : ′(x)=(x)
and for all i∈{0; 1; : : : ; r − 1} : ′(xi) = sT (xi).
Now we prove that ′ is stable. Suppose that (ut ; v3−t) blocks ′. Since  is stable,
(ut ; v3−t) cannot block . But in ′ the only participants with di4erent partners than in
 are xi ∈X and yi ∈Y and of these, only xi have poorer partners in ′. Hence one
of u; v, say u, must be xi. Since no pair absent from T= can block ′, (ut ; v3−t)∈T=.
Hence u’s partner in ′ is Mrst in his list in T= and since v3−t ∈T=, u, must prefer
fT= to v3−t , a contradiction.
Corollary 23. Let T be an input pro8le of Phase 2. If any preference list becomes
empty in the course of Phase 2, then there is no stable matching embedded in T .
If there is a stable matching embedded in T then any output pro8le of Phase 2
constitutes a stable matching.
The preceding analysis can be summarized in the following
Theorem 24. The Stable Crews Algorithm is correct, i.e., for any instance (N;P) of
the SCP it correctly decides the existence of a stable matching.
We leave it to the reader to show by an analysis similar to the analysis of Irving’s
algorithm in [2] that the SCP algorithm can be implemented to run in O(n2) time,
where n is the number of participants.
5. Conclusion
Notice, that for the simplicity of presentation, we have deMned a stable matching
as a full matching (i.e. one in which each participant is assigned a partner), although
we allowed in the input preference lists unacceptable partners. However, it is certainly
possible to deMne a partial stable matching and a discussion similar to that in [2],
Section 4.5.2. leads to
Theorem 25. For a solvable stable crews instance, involving unacceptable partners,
the set of participants is partitioned into two subsets: those that are matched in every
stable matching and those that are matched in none. The former subset comprises
precisely those persons who have a nonempty list after Phase 1 of the SCP algorithm.
The particular matching obtained by the Stable Crews Algorithm depends on the
order of double favourites elimination as well as on the choice of rotations eliminated
in the course of Phase 2 of the algorithm. Due to Lemma 16 we believe that it would
be possible to describe the structure of all stable matchings using the structure of
rotations, like in the Stable Roommates Problem.
Similarly, as in the SRP, one might admit indi4erences in the participants’ preference
lists. Now, the stability notions for SRP with ties, as deMned in [4], can be extended
also to the SCP context. We can say that a matching  is weakly stable, if there
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exists no pair of participants a; b and a pair of roles r; 3− r, such that br 	a (a) and
a3−r 	b (b) and  is super-stable, if there exists no pair of participants a; b and a
pair of roles r; 3 − r, such that br a (a) and a3−r b (b). Due to Theorem 4 and
the classical result of Ronn [6], it follows that the problem to decide the existence of a
weakly stable matching in an instance of the SCP with indi4erences is an NP-complete
problem. On the other hand, Irving and Manlove [4] recently proposed a polynomial
algorithm for the Super-stable Roommates Problem and we believe that this algorithm
could also be extended to handle participants with roles.
The SCP problem is, to our knowledge, the Mrst matching problem analyzing
situations in which the partners in a pair have assigned roles not derived solely from
the identity of the respective person. Let us notice here that two similar problems,
one seeking crews consisting of three persons performing three di4erent roles and the
other one asking for crews consisting of three persons with one designated leader, are
NP-complete, since their special case is the 3-Gender Stable Marriage problem, shown
to be NP-complete in [5].
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